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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Cordingly appeals from the denial of his Motion To Dismiss, which asserted a 
violation of his right to religious freedom as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code 
(I.C.) § 73-402 (Idaho Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On February 23, 2008, Boise City Police Officer Stace, was on foot patrol near 
the Cactus Bar, located at 6th St. and Main St. As Mr. Cordingly exited the Cactus Bar 
he noticed the officer and attempted to get his attention, yelled words to the effect, "hey, 
Boise's finest," and gestured for Stace to stop walking and to come to where Mr. 
Cordingly was standing. Officer Stace waited for Mr. Cordingly to approach his position. 
When Mr. Cordingly met Officer Stace, the men talked briefly. Officer Stace indicated 
that he needed to be on his way. However, Mr. Cordingly insisted on talking to them. 
As Mr. Cordingly spoke, Officer Stace could smell a very strong odor of marijuana. Just 
then, Boise City Police Officer Urian walked up to the two men as they spoke. Officer 
Urian acted as though he knew Mr. Cordingly and Officer Urian and Mr. Cordingly spoke 
briefly concerning a previous meeting the two had had the previous year. As the men 
spoke, Officer Urian said to Officer Stace, "you can see the marijuana on him, can't 
you?" Officer Stace then answered, "yes I can." Tr., p.21, Ls.6-9. Officer Urian then 
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asked Mr. Cordingly if he had any marijuana on his person, to which Mr. Cordingly 
replied "yes." In plain view could be seen a glass smoking pipe located in the large 
warming pocket in the front of the pullover "hoodie" sweatshirt that Mr. Cordingly was 
wearing. Mr. Cordingly was then arrested and transported to the Ada County Jail on 
charges of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, violations of 
Idaho Code §§ 37-2732 and 37 -2734(A). 
Mr. Cordingly plead not guilty on March 14, 2008, and a Pre-Trial Conference 
was scheduled for June 10, 2008, and Jury Trial was scheduled for July 3,2008, which 
were later continued. On August 28, 2008, Mr. Cordingly filed a "Motion for Dismissal 
(Free Exercise of Religion)." A hearing on the motion was scheduled for October 14, 
2008. On October 29,2009, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order Denying the 
Motion to Dismiss. On October 30, 2008, the parties met for another Pre-Trial 
Conference where the parties entered into an agreement. The State permitted the 
Defendant to give additional oral testimony to support his written Motion and in 
exchange, Mr. Cordingly would accept as fact, the allegations made by Officer Stace 
and Officer Urian and the court would then render a "final" decision on the Motion To 
Dismiss. 
On December 5, 2008, the court heard additional testimony from Mr. Cordingly. 
The City Attorney cross-examined Mr. Cordingly. Additionally, the court inquired of Mr. 
Cordingly. After all evidence in support of the Motion to Dismiss had been taken, the 
court entered its Order Denying Motion To Dismiss on January 29, 2009. 
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Mr. Cordingly entered a Conditional Plea to possession of marijuana and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, violations of Idaho Code §§ 37-2732 and 37-2734(A), 
on July 10, 2009. An Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal was subsequently 
entered and on August 24, 2009, Mr. Cordingly filed his appeal. 
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Evidence Submitted in Support of Motion To Dismiss 
Mr. Cordingly testified that he is an ordained minister and Founder and President 
of the Church of Cognitive Therapy, based in Portland, Oregon. He is also a follower of 
the Rastafarian religion. Tr., p.8, Ls.14-21 - p.23, Ls. 13-17. He appeals his conviction 
of the charges based upon his sincere religious beliefs. Mr. Cordingly alleged that his 
conviction under I.C. §§ 37-2732 and 37-2734(A) has substantially burdened his right to 
religious freedom guaranteed to him under Idaho Code § 73-402, titled Free Exercise Of 
Religion Protected, The Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA) as well as the 
federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and Article 1, §§ 4 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and the 1st and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
During the taking of oral testimony on December 5,2008, Mr. Cordingly testified 
that what the Officers referred to as marijuana is known spiritually as cannabis. 
Cannabis as a "sacrament" has been used in religious services for over 10,000 years. 
He and all members of his Church of Cognitive Therapy (COCT) carry it on their 
persons in containers clearly marked "sacrament" with the words, "[t]he sacrament for 
the Church of Cognitive Therapy, using the full exercise of religious belief. Not for sale . 
. . ," and that when it is used in conjunction with prayer, it aids and comforts those 
people in need. Tr., p. 38, Ls. 22-25 - p. 39. The central tenant of belief is that the 
sacramental use of cannabis leads to spiritual enlightenment and brings one closer to 
the creator of the universe, or God. The use of cannabis is the same exercise of 
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meditation as prayer in this religion. Minister Cordingly testified that the use of cannabis 
was "vital and mandatory" in the everyday practice of this religion "as if the Buddha 
himself ate hemp seed." Tr. p. 10. Referring to the larger Rastafarian religion, to which 
he is also a member, Mr. Cordingly testified that there are now as many as twelve 
million people on this planet that use cannabis as part of a religion. Tr. p. 10, II. 18-19. 
The church utilizes the Bible as well as other texts as everyday tools to understand the 
path of enlightenment and the meaning of God. In this regard the COCT is 
nondenominational in its approach, but one must partake of the sacrament in COCT or 
"it would be pointless for them." The "whole idea of using entheogenic sacraments is to 
get us closer to our creator." Tr. p. 50, II. 19-25. 
The sacrament may be administered to any person in need, irrespective of 
whether the needy are inside a building of worship or on the sidewalk. Tr., p. 21-24. 
Normally - and preferably - the sacrament would only be administered in private by an 
ordained minister, out of respect for law. Nonetheless, it may be administered 
anywhere at any time, under the direction of the local minister. Tr., pp. 27-28. A 
minister who notices a person in "need," typically a homeless person who appears 
angry or confused or when decisions of life are weighing heavily on the individual's 
mind, may approach the individual and then try to aid and comfort them through the use 
of the sacrament of cannabis. If the individual is seen privately, typically the minister 
will talk to them. After talking to them, the minister will hand the sacrament to the 
individual and instruct him or her on how to use it privately. If the needy person is seen 
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in a public setting, the minister will typically accompany the person to a place of privacy, 
after which the minister removes some of the sacrament out of the marked sacrament 
containers and after putting the sacrament in a chalice, raises it above their heads and 
proclaims the sacrament "as a burnt offering and offers a prayer on behalf of the needy 
person, thanking God for the sacrament and the comfort afforded them and asks for 
blessings on behalf of the afflicted person. Tr., p. 46, Ls. 4-11- p. 49, Ls. 5-8. 
Any person wishing to become an ordained minister of CaCT usually accesses 
the CaCT website and pays the listed fee and requests a membership card. Tr., p. 40, 
Ls. 16-19. Interested persons gain membership in CaCT typically by the personal 
recommendation of another member to the Board of Directors. In order to screen out 
those persons who would attempt to use CaCT as a means of unsanctioned or 
recreational use of cannabis, the Board requires those wishing to join the church to 
send their "testimony" so that the Board may determine the alleged interested person's 
sincerity in the belief that the prayerful, sacramental, entheogenic use of cannabis is 
effective to themselves and their creator. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 13-23. CaCT condemns the 
non-religious or recreational use of cannabis, and any person attempting to use 
cannabis that does not have a membership card and does not have the sacrament 
contained in and labeled with an official "sacrament stickers" is sanctioned by the 
Board. Tr., p. 38 - p. 39,49, Ls. 1-25. 
Mr. Cordingly explained that his church is an organized, spiritual community 
comprised of anywhere between five to twenty believers of different religious systems, 
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including but not limited to Buddhists, Rastafarian Christians and others that utilize 
cannabis as a component of their beliefs to reach spiritual enlightenment. Tr., p. 30, 41, 
Ls. 19-25, Ls. 1-2, p. 58, Ls. 1-14. The exclusive purpose of the Church is to use 
cannabis as a sacrament to achieve spiritual enlightenment. Tr., p. 59, L. 25 - p. 60. 
There would be no CaCT without the use of cannabis. Tr., p. 51, Ls. 4-25 - p. 52, p. 
53, Ls. 1-9. The entheogenic use of cannabis is required for every member because 
the only purpose for the CaCT is to utilize sacramental cannabis to reach spiritual 
enlightenment, spiritually connect with their universe, their creator, and become better 
people. Tr., p. 60. Should a member choose not to use cannabis, his membership 
would be in question. Tr. p. 50, Ls. 11-25 - p. 51, Ls. 1-6, p. 56. Meetings of CaCT 
are held every other Sunday, for four hours. These spiritual meetings begin and end 
with prayer. Potluck dinner is provided, sacrament is administered, music is employed 
and discussion of members' interests in religion, spirituality, life and death and 
references to cannabis biblically are discussed. Tr., p. 30, Ls 18-25 - pp.31-32. CaCT 
is nondenominational, celebrates most major holidays including Christmas, Easter, as 
well as non-Christian important dates in the Hindu faith and other important dates, such 
as the date that the founder of Rastafarian Christianity, Haile Selassie I, came to 
Jamaica. CaCT believes in an ultimate creator, although use of the term "God" is used 
in a generalized, "God-is-the-universe" way, so as not to offend those that are not 
Christians. Tr. p. 36-37, Ls. 1-25. 
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The entheogenic use of cannabis is required by members of CaCT. The term 
entheogenic means "as used to expand the individual's spirituality on their quest for 
enlightenment." Cannabis is the elixir or spiritual enhancer. Mr. Cordingly testified that 
based on his studies, "different cultures have used ... entheogenic sacraments to 
spiritually enhance them for times of prayer, for times of sickness, for times of comfort." 
Tr., p. 33, Ls. 21-25 - p. 34. Mr. Cordingly explained his spiritual journey through his 
own addictions early in life, and how a spiritual experience stopped his abuse. Tr. 50, 
Ls. 7-10. For the next part of his life until the present, Mr. Cordingly has used cannabis 
only spiritually, to aid the homeless whom he gained a great affinity for during his 
tribulations, to overcome their post-traumatic stress disorders, depression and spiritual 
deficits. Tr. pp. 60-62. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did The District Court Err When the Court Affirmed the Magistrate's Decision 




The right to religious freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and by Article I, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. Prior to 
1990, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment to protect religious practices which have been substantially burdened 
by governmental regulation unless the government could show a compelling state 
interest. However, despite this Amendment's broad grant of religious liberty made 
applicable to the States by virtue of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has all but shut the door to using the compelling state's interest test to 
protect an individual's religious interests, with the limited exception of requests for 
unemployment compensation, lowering the burden of proof to a "reasonable" standard 
to individual requests to exempt from state laws certain religiously motivated conduct, 
as long as the law forbidding such conduct is both neutral and of general applicability. 
To give protection and require the State to show a compelling state interest test in those 
situations would be difficult to sustain and because of such, the Court warned that 
"[permitting] this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to 
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 886-888 (1990). Accordingly, Mr. Cordingly does not bring his appeal based on 
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 
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As a result of Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Restoration Act of 1993 
(hereinafter RFRA), Pub. I. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) and codified as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. This was enacted to restore to the States the high burden 
previously required of any governmental regulation, even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability which substantially burdened an individual's free exercise of 
religion to use the least restrictive means of furthering or protecting a compelling state 
interest. 
However, just four years later the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the RFRA as 
it applied to the States, reasoning that such legislation exceeded the authority of 
Congress to enforce such legislation. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
This in turn lead many states, including Idaho to enact their own legislation in order to 
bolster their state's protection of religious liberty. Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 
540 F.3d 231,244-247 (3rd Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
In 2000, Idaho enacted the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act, Idaho Code 
§ 73-402, (hereinafter "FERPA"), resurrecting the higher "compelling interest test" 
standard in religious exercise cases. This Act allows the State government to 
"substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person is both: (a) [e]ssential to further a compelling 
governmental interest; [and] (b) [t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest." I.C. § 73-402(3). The Act also provides that a person may 
assert a violation as a defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
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against the government, including attorney's fees and costs. § 73-402(4). It is 
indisputable that Idaho's lawmakers have chosen to afford Idaho citizens a higher 
degree of protection from laws that burden religious beliefs. Since its enactment, our 
Idaho appellate courts have had several occasions to interpret Idaho's Free Exercise of 
Religion Protected Act. 
In Roles v. Townsend, 138 Idaho 412, 64 P.3d 338 (Idaho ct. App. 2003), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals heard from Mr. Roles, who was an inmate at the Idaho 
Department of Correction (I DOC) in 1995. He was also a smoker of tobacco. When the 
Board of Prisons made the decision to make IDOC a smoke-free environment Mr. Roles 
challenged the policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the State and 
Roles appealed on the basis of Idaho's new FERPA, claiming that he smoked tobacco 
religiously because the smoke carried his prayers, kept evil and sickness away and 
purified his spirit. The Appellate Court's decision mirrored the balancing approach 
called for in FERPA, which was the test used pre-Smith, in all First Amendment Free 
Exercise cases, i.e., whether the government's action substantially burdened Roles' 
right to exercise his religious belief and practice versus the State's belief that if Roles 
were permitted to smoke it would be a hardship on the staff of IDOC and it's resources 
to regulate such use would compromise prison staff and would expose other inmates 
and staff to second-hand smoke. In finding for the State, the Court said, "Roles has 
failed to develop ... any evidence that disputes that the state's interests are compelling, 
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that the tobacco-free policy is essential to its interests, and that the tobacco-free policy 
is the least restrictive means to further those interests. Id. at 414. 
In Lewis v. State. Dept. of Transp., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2006), Lawrence D. Lewis appealed the Department of Transportation's requirement 
that he give the Department of Transportation his social security number as part of his 
application for a driver's license. Lewis claimed that the number issued to him by the 
Social Security Administration was a precursor to and actually was the "mark of the 
beast" mentioned in the Bible. Following the Administrative Hearing Officer's decision 
sustaining the department's requirement, he appealed unsuccessfully to the Director of 
the Department of Transportation and finally to the district court. The district court 
remanded the case back to the department for findings consistent with the FERPA. The 
department concluded that Lewis had a sincere belief and religious motivation for his 
refusal, but articulated the State's compelling state interests which included being in 
compliance with federal law, which it argued preempted State law in that area and 
mandated all states to collect the social security numbers of applicants. The 
department concluded that it could not think of a less restrictive means of compliance 
with federal law than simple compliance. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals found that 42 U.S.C. § 666, which was the 
department's mandate, did preempt Idaho's FERPA if any of it's provisions, which Lewis 
maintained protected his right to refuse to comply, and found that the effective collection 
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of child support was a compelling State interest and outweighed Lewis' religious 
practice. Id. at 691. 
In Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 152 P.3d 653 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007), an Idaho 
inmate housed at the Idaho Maximum Security Institute (IMSI) filed for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus attempting to overturn the warden's decision to shut down the sweat lodge, 
which he claimed violated his right to practice his Native American religion under the 
Federal and State Constitutions, the Religious Exercises in Land Use and by 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et. seq; and FERPA, Idaho 
Code § 73-401, et seq. Warden Fisher had shut down the sweat lodge due to other 
inmates roasting hotdogs over the sweat lodge fire. Prior to this ban, the Idaho 
Department of Correction (IDOC) had permitted other Native American religious 
practices including smudging, wearing a choker, possessing a feather and certain 
herbs, kinnikinnik and ceremonial pipe smoking. Id. at 654. Following the district 
court's denial of his motion, Hyde appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals denied the 
claims under the RLUIPA as well as FERPA because Hyde had failed to file the 
required bond prior to filing suit. The Court remanded the case to the district court to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the federal claims. However, in dicta, 
the Court's opinion strongly suggests that it is a balancing test between the competing 
interests of religious liberty and governmental interests. The Court stated: 
In Smith, the Court abandoned the earlier standard and held 
that the First Amendment is not offended by laws of general 
applicability that only incidentally burden religious conduct. 
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Subsequently, the Idaho legislature adopted the FERPA, 
declaring that "[f]ree exercise of religion is a fundamental 
right that applies in this state, even if law, rules or other 
government actions are facially neutral. I.C. § 73-402(1). In 
its statement of legislative intent, the Idaho legislature 
recognized that "[t]his state has independent authority to 
protect the free exercise of religion by principles that are 
separate from, complementary to and more expansive than 
the first amendment of the United States Constitution. 
(citations omitted). The legislature indicated its finding that 
the "compelling interest, as set forth in the federal cases of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed.2d 
15 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 
1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, (1963) is a workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
governmental interests Id. at 655. 
The Yoder case, decided in 1972, dealt with Amish parents who did not want to 
obey the Wisconsin law requiring compulsory school attendance and claimed that being 
required to continue informal education past the eighth grade violated their rights under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Amish supported their religious 
claims cogently and persuasively with expert witnesses and scholars on religion and 
education. The State of Wisconsin argued that the State had a huge responsibility to 
educate it's citizens and that reasonable regulations were necessary to accomplish this 
supremely important responsibility, even if it impinged on the religious practices of 
citizens living within it's borders. 
The United States Supreme Court utilized a classic balancing approach, as the 
following quote illustrates: 
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having high 
responsibility for education of its citizens to impose 
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reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic 
education, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to 
provide an equivalent education in a privately operated 
system. .. Thus, a State's interest in universal education, 
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing 
process when it impinges on fundamental rights and 
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,. .. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-214, 92 S.Ct. 1526,32 L.Ed.2d 15 
(1972). 
Sherbert v. Verner was decided in 1963 by the United States Supreme Court. It 
dealt with a member of the Seventh Day Adventist religion who was fired after she 
refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day. She was unable to obtain 
unemployment compensation benefits because she would not take work offered to her. 
She appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court who sustained the commission's 
decision. She appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court, in another balancing 
approach of the competing interests of religious practices versus the flimsy contention 
that such unemployment claims may be fraudulently prepared and thus dilute the 
State's compensation fund, found for the Appellant stating: 
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to 
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly 
sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for 
permissible limitation. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
406, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963) (quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
In a recent decision from Idaho, State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 
(Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Mar. 21, 2012), the Court of Appeals for Idaho 
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determined that the defendant, Cary W. White's use of marijuana was not supported by 




The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Cordingly's Motion To Dismiss 
Because He Was Denied His Right To Religious Freedom As Guaranteed By 
Idaho Code Section 73-402 
A. Standard of Review 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, 
this court reviews the decision of the district court directly. State v. White, 152 Idaho 
361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011). The Court must "examine the magistrate record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from 
those findings." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct.App.2008). 
The court exercises free review of the application and construction of statutes. State v. 
White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011). 
B. Argument 
The Magistrate's reliance on 10th Circuit case law was error. Throughout its 
decision, the trial court made reference to United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th 
Cir. 1996). Meyers is not controlling law in Idaho. Meyers is a case from the 10th 
Federal Circuit construing the identical federal statute involving dissimilar facts with the 
exception that the controlled substance at issue was marijuana as in the instant case. 
However, the federal statute Federal Religious Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was 
declared unconstitutional in Boerne v. Flores, supra at p. 9, and the trial court's reliance 
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on non-controlling case law construing an unconstitutional federal statute to decide 
Idaho cases is manifestly wrong and must be overturned. 
This case must be decided under Idaho's FERPA, § 73-402 et. seq. intentionally 
providing higher protection for diverse religious practices than the federal constitution 
now provides. Idaho law has maintained that where the language of a statute is clear, 
that is, when the language of the statute defines the conduct to be proscribed with 
sufficient clarity that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not demonstrate arbitrariness or discriminatory enforcement, it must 
be given its plain and obvious meaning, without any statutory construction. State v. 
Martin, No. 63 slip. op. September 4,2009 (Idaho ct. App. 2009). 
Idaho's and other states' lawmakers took legislative action invited by the 
Supreme Court's rejection of RFRA in Boerne. This understanding, coupled with the 
plain, unambiguous language in the statute, and our appellate court's interpretation of 
the statute thus far, requires this Court to overturn Mr. Cordingly's conviction for 
violating I.C. §§ 37-2732 and 37-2734(A), laws which otherwise are valid, neutral laws 
of general application, but which unquestionably burden Mr. Cordingly's right to practice 
his religion. 
The bill's original statement of purpose and fiscal impact is instructive: 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 09829C1 (Senate Bill No. 1394) 
The purpose of this legislation is to reestablish a test which 
courts must use to determine whether a person's religious 
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belief should be accommodated when a government action 
or regulation restricts his or her religious practice. The test, 
known as the "compelling interest test," requires the 
government to prove with evidence that its regulation is (1) 
essential to achieve a compelling governmental interest and 
(2) it is the least restrictive means of achieving the 
government's compelling interest. 
Prior to 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court used the above test-
the "compelling interest test"--when deciding religious 
claims. However, in a 1990 decision (Employment Div. of 
Oregon v. Smith) the Court tipped the scales of justice in 
favor of government regulation by throwing out the 
compelling interest test, which had shielded our religious 
freedom from onerous government regulation for more than 
30 years. The Smith decision reduced the standard of 
review in religious freedom cases to a "reasonableness 
standard." While all other fundamental rights (freedom of 
speech, press, assembly, etc.) remain protected by the 
stringent "compelling interest test," the Court singled out 
religious freedom by reducing its protection to the weak 
"reasonableness test." 
A widely recognized principle of law is that states are free to 
protect an individual's right with a much higher standard than 
the U.S. Constitution itself affords. Thus, in light of this 
principle in conjunction with the Boerne decision, states are 
free to enact their own RFRA's thereby choosing to apply the 
higher "compelling interest test" standard in their own 
religious freedoms cases ... 
Contrary to the erroneous Meyer decision and the trial court's misguided use of 
the same, the statute does not involve a micro-inspection of an individual's belief system 
to determine whether a belief is sincerely held or is an actual religious conviction. This 
language in Meyer undoubtedly came from the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, 
supra. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
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Respondents also note that the sacramental use of peyote is 
central to the tenets of the Native American Church, but I 
agree with the Court, that because it is not within the judicial 
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices 
to a faith, our determination of the constitutionality of 
Oregon's general criminal prohibition cannot, and should not, 
turn on the centrality of the particular religious practice at 
issue. This does not mean, of course, that courts may not 
make factual findings as to whether a claimant holds a 
sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with, and thus is 
burdened by, the challenged law. Smith (Justice O'Connor 
Concurring Opinion). 
Idaho Courts have had one opportunity to address whether I.C. §§ 37-2732 (c) 
and 37 -2734(A) substantially burden an individual's right to religious use of a controlled 
substance covered under these sections. In State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 
1217 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Mar. 21, 2012), the Court of Appeals for Idaho 
determined that the defendant, Cary W. White's use of marijuana was not supported by 
evidence of use for substantial religious beliefs. In that case, the defendant did not 
consider himself to be a "member of any legally-recognized religion [ .. .]" lQ. at 1223. The 
Court goes further to list some of the legally-recognized religions: "several recognized 
organized religious groups, including the Church of Cognitive Therapy, Rastafarianism 
(which the Ninth Circuit has recognized as involving the use of marijuana as a 
sacrament), and Native American Medicine." Id. Furthermore, in United States v. 
Bauer, 84 F .3d 1549, 1559 (9 th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit recognized that in applying 
this Act to possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use may indicate 
possession for a sincere religious purpose. Bauer, 84 F.3 1549. 
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This case differs from the White case in several respects. First, in the White 
case, the defendant acknowledged that he was not a member of a legally-recognized 
church or religion. Here, Mr. Cordingly has stated that he is a founding member of the 
Church of Cognitive Therapy. Mr. Cordingly has never stated that he was not a member 
of a legally recognized church. Based on the decision in White, the Church of Cognitive 
Therapy is a "recognized organized religious group." State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 
P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011). Because Mr. Cordingly's membership is with a legally-
recognized church, his right to utilize the sacrament is protected as a fundamental part 
of his exercise of his religious freedom. 
Second, Mr. Cordingly's religion is Rastafarianism. This religion is one which "the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized as an organized religious group using marijuana as a 
sacrament" as quoted in White, 271 P.3d 1217 at 1223. Because Mr. Cordingly's church 
and religion are legally recognized, his free exercise of the right to use the sacrament 
cannot be seriously challenged in this case. The Magistrate and District Court erred in 
this analysis. 
At the core of the Magistrates decision was the argument that the use of 
marijuana is not a serious religious ritual, but reflective of a mere philosophy of some 
sort, or something other than a sincerely held religious belief. The reasoning of the 
magistrate is that the use of marijuana is not religious because that would send the 
court down "the slippery slope" assuring any individual "the absolute freedom to worship 
what he or she chooses in the way he or she chooses." Apparently this concept could 
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include "criminals" who could "thwart prosecution for crimes done in the name of 
religion." Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at p. 5. The District Court readily 
adopted this analysis finding that COCT presents an "ideology of philosophical belief as 
to how people can become spiritual or enlightened, but it does not have a 
comprehensive belief system with the trappings of a religion." Memorandum Decision 
and Order, pp. 6-7. These conclusions are not supported by the record and testimony 
before the court. 
The Magistrate and District Court were greatly confused by the difference 
between the church and a religion. COCT is a church organized for the purposes of 
using a common sacrament - cannabis - that one uses in the free exercise of one's 
religion, which in Mr. Cordingly's case is Rastafarianism. Rastafarians have a wide 
ranging belief system which incorporates the Old Testament, the New Testament, 
modern day prophecy and fulfillment of the scriptures. Haile Sa lise I and Bob Marley are 
only recent and well known examples of leaders of a movement that include millions of 
people in Africa, Jamaica and throughout the world, people that use cannabis as a 
sacrament to connect to the higher power of God. To say that Mr. Cordingly's use of 
marijuana was not done in the free exercise of his religion is unsupported by this record. 
It would only be fair to say that a substantial portion of Mr. Cordingly's entire life is 
devoted to use of cannabis. He is a minister and founder of a church, an organized 
group that is formed for a religious purpose. 
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It is impossible to separate the practice of smoking or utilizing the sacrament 
from Mr. Cordingly's religious beliefs. To do so is a futile attempt to define what an 
acceptable religious belief is. The court cannot separate out yoga, fasting, tai chi, or any 
other form of acceptable non-violent behavior that may be integral to attainment of 
spiritual enlightenment or communion with the Judeo-Christian concept of God. To do 
so is to reject the fact that the majority of the religious people on this planet utilize a 
wide variety of techniques to attain enlightenment in daily life. Prayer, meditation and 
yoga are but a few of the fine examples of how religious groups incorporate the 
teachings of their religion into the routines of their lives. No one has said that yoga or 
cannabis are religions, but the practice of each may be a part of an organized religious 
group's belief. The court below fundamentally missed this point in the denial of Mr. 
Cordingly's free exercise of his religious belief. 
The Idaho Legislature created the great protection now relied upon by Mr. 
Cordingly under FERPA. He has demonstrated that his sincere religious belief includes 
the use of cannabis as sacrament. If this freedom conflicts with controlled substance 
acts of Idaho, it should be the concern of the courts in its analysis of whether Mr. 
Cordingly is entitled to protection. There is no support in the record for the finding that 
Mr. Cordingly was not engaged in the free exercise of his religion. 
Application of FERPA to the Instant Case; Compelling Interest Analysis 
Idaho law makes no exceptions for the use of marijuana (cannabis) in Idaho and 
Idaho Code §§ 37-2732 and 37-2734(A), laws which are otherwise valid, neutral laws of 
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general application, unquestionably burden Mr. Cordingly's right to practice his religion. 
The State has not provided any evidence of a compelling state interest in preventing 
marijuana use in Idaho. The State must show that the limited, spiritual use of cannabis 
by ordained ministers of COCT is so dangerous or unreasonable that nothing short of a 
total ban can advance the State's arguable interest in preventing use and abuse of 
dangerous drugs. The State did not offer any such evidence below. There is no record 
of any evidence. One could surmise that cannabis is dangerous or that it leads to 
drinking alcohol, criminal behavior, drug use, or other well established dangerous 
activities, but there is no evidence in this record. Mr. Cordingly testified that he uses the 
sacrament to help others in distress and for his own spiritual religious purpose. That is 
the record before the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cordingly asserts that the Magistrate and District Court erred when they 
relied upon non-controlling, federal case law interpreting an unconstitutional federal 
statute in deciding whether the Idaho statutes burdened his right to practice his religion. 
He argues that he is the member of an organized church and religion and uses the 
sacrament to help only those who have a sincere religious interest in the use of 
cannabis. Finally, he cites the lack of any evidence to support the City of Boise's 
complete ban on the religious, limited use of cannabis without a compelling state 
interest. Mr. Cordingly is entitled to relief under the Idaho's Free Exercise of Religion 
Protected Act. 
DATED this -'L'iJay of July, 2012. 
q,~~. 
J. SEPH L. ELLSWORTH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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